Abstract:
Elections are processes, events as well as celebrations in a representative democracy like India. So, elections and electoral reforms have often been a topic of discussion and deliberation in the public sphere of India. The proposal regarding the introduction of the simultaneous election system is one such widely debated electoral reform currently. It proposes to hold elections at both the central as well as the state levels, simultaneously at a fixed date every five years. India has experienced simultaneous elections from 1952 to 1967, after which this system was discarded as a result of certain political changes. Three reports of different governmental institutions have played a significant role in shaping the nature of the debate regarding the simultaneous election system: the 170th report of the Law Commission of India, the 79th report of the Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice and a recently published discussion paper by the NITI Ayog. Also at a more political level, the President and the Prime Minister of India have strongly pitched their support for simultaneous election on a variety of forums.
There are mainly two justifications given for simultaneous elections, namely, reducing financial burden on the exchequer and removing a ‘policy paralysis’ emerging as a result of the Model Code of Conduct. However, the problem lies not in the desirability of simultaneous elections but in its feasibility. Implementation of this electoral reform is likely to seriously affect the federal nature of Indian polity. The slogan of ‘One Nation, One Election’ seems to be unitary in nature as it ignores the autonomy of the state’s elections. It may produce uniformity in the composition of political parties ruling at the central and state levels, as it is most likely to prefer the national parties over the regional ones. It will also possibly facilitate the national ruling parties dominating the state governments through employing the Article 356 when the existing state governments lose the confidence of their respective assemblies and no other political party/coalition is able to claim support of the majority. The simultaneous elections might also erode the very purpose of the Rajya Sabha, namely, representing the states and working as a check on the popular house of the Parliament (Lok Sabha).
The debate around simultaneous elections has highlighted different defects in its functioning and produced a public debate regarding how to remove those effects. However, in this journey, the Indian democracy can’t afford to damage its federal nature by further strengthening the central government and the national political parties in an already vertically asymmetric federal polity. We can take away lessons from this ongoing debate regarding the simultaneous election system and explore better alternatives that will bring about efficiency in our system but not at the cost of further weakening the federal units, that is, the states of the ‘Union of India.’ What a better purpose a public debate and deliberation can serve in enriching the world’s largest democracy!
FEASIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERALISM IN INDIA
– ANAND JAYSHETTE
Elections are not only the mechanical processes but also an expression of an organic relation between the citizens and their representatives in democracy. In spite of a huge political and socio-cultural diversity, India owns a unique history of running a democratic system successfully through popular elections for the last seven decades, except some disturbances in the decade of 1970s. Regular elections are the instrument through which India’s citizens are facilitated to run the government through their elected representatives. So, elections are processes, events as well as celebrations in the Indian democracy.
Considering the significance of elections in Indian democracy, the electoral reforms have been a widely discussed area. Many major-stones in electoral reforms, to name a few, the Tarkunde Committee, the Dinesh Goswami committee, have encouraged public debates around the reforms in the sphere of popular elections. The debates around the alternatives to the First-past-the-post system, use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and holding simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and legislative assemblies are nowadays few such deliberate attempts in order to bring reforms in our electoral system.
Debate of Simultaneous Elections: A Historical Overview
The proposal of the simultaneous elections system proposes to take elections at both, the central as well as the state level, simultaneously at a fixed date after each five years. India has experienced simultaneous elections from 1952 to 1967. But these simultaneous elections were not ‘designed’ as such. The dominance of the ‘congress system’ facilitated these elections. However, we could not continue with the simultaneous election after 1967 because of the changing nature of the politics in India.
A debate of the simultaneous elections is not a very recent one. It is as old as one that got a major momentum in the 1990s. The Law Commission of India talked about a wide range of electoral reforms in its 170th report on ‘Reform of the Electoral Laws’ in 1999. And it recommended the simultaneous elections as one of ways to bring ‘stable governments.’ It also suggested ways how this reform can be brought about gradually by aligning elections of different state legislative assemblies with that of the Lok Sabha.
Another influential case in favor of simultaneous elections was made by the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice which submitted its report to both the houses of the parliament in December 2015. This 79th report was titled as ‘Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies.’ It discussed the feasibility of this reform in detail. It has contributed to the debate on simultaneous elections through one of its recommendations which suggests taking simultaneous elections in two phases, roughly each after two-and-half years. This suggestion will, according to the report, reduce the curtailment in the period of existing assemblies in order to align them with the General elections.
This issue is debated not only at the institutional levels as mentioned above but at the political one as well. Our Prime Minister Narendra Modi is the person who has re-initiated this debate in the public sphere. He has been advocating conducting simultaneous elections at many forums like the meetings of the governing council of the NITI Ayog and the Law Commission of India and so on. Also, while addressing the parliament, the President Ramnath Kovind asked the members of Parliament (MPs) to discuss and consider the simultaneous elections as a way to reform our electoral system. So, both, the head of the government and the head of the executive, have strongly pitched their support for the simultaneous elections in India.
Why Simultaneous Elections?
Simultaneous elections are justified mainly for two reasons. One, it will reduce the financial burden of the exchequer. According to a discussion paper published by the NITI Ayog, titled ‘Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The “What”, “When” and “How”’, the 2009 Lok Sabha elections incurred Rs. 1115 crores and the 2014 Lok Sabha elections Rs. 3870 crores. It shows that the Govt. of India spends a huge amount of money on conducting elections and that also is strikingly increasing day by day. Besides, political parties also spend a huge amount on elections. Some news agencies’ estimate this spending by political parties on the 2014 Lok Sabha elections could be more than Rs. 30000 crores. So, if we take simultaneous elections, political parties do not need to spend extra on separately on the central and state elections.
Second justification is related to ‘policy paralysis.’ The Election Commission of India (ECI) is empowered to enforce the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) for the purpose of fair elections. The MCC puts some restrictions on the governments regarding announcements of new policies. And, on an average, at least three to four different elections take place in India every year. So, the governments are always in the ‘election mode.’ It obstructs governance. As simultaneous elections will reduce the number of elections to only once a year, the central and state governments will have to face the MCC once a year. Hence, these governments will be able to deliver their developmental policies for almost four and half years with any obstacles.
Also, there are some other justifications too. Simultaneous elections will reduce the burden on the security personnel, deployed to ensure safe and peaceful elections. As noted by Dr. Y. S. Quarishi, simultaneous elections will contain the incidences of communalism, casteism and other polarizing events that frequent elections breed.
Is the notion of ‘One Nation, One Election’ unitary in nature?
Like, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) reform was guided by the notion of ‘One Nation, One Tax’, the guiding notion in the case of simultaneous election is the notion of ‘One Nation, One Election.’ Although uniformity brings order in the system, it is inherently harmful for diversity.
On the background of the homogenous Western democracies, diversity and democracy were conceived to be contradictory to each other. As we all know, the preservation of democracy along with promoting diversity is one of the contributions of the Indian democracy to the theories and practice of democracy. The slogan of ‘One Nation, One Election’ suggests there should be only one election after a fixed period, that is, five years. It attempts to do away with different elections at the different levels in the Indian polity, mainly at the national and state levels {and Panchayat levels (3rd tier)}. But federalism is one of the basic structure principles of the Constitution of India. So, the slogan of ‘One Nation, One Election’, the guiding notion of simultaneous election debate, is unitary in nature, for it will negate the autonomy of state elections.
Impact on regional parties
Often, issues in the national elections tend to influence the political choices of the people in their respective state elections. According to a recent study published by the IDFC, there is a 77% chance that Indian voters will vote for the same party for both the centre and state in case of a simultaneous election. It clearly underlines that the significance of the developmental issues related to the states will get sidelined by the wave of the issues involved in the national elections. Also, simultaneous elections will reduce the chances of regional parties to come to power. This electoral reform is likely to give more possibilities of the national parties getting upper hand on and dominating the regional ones by monopolizing the central and state governments. And if regional parties consequently become weaker, the diverse demands of states, which are integral federal units, will not be able to reach the central as well as state governments.
If we want to align different assembly election-cycles with that of the Lok Sabha, it is necessary to either prepone or postpone the current expected schedule of the assembly elections. It leads to, then, two important questions. One is whether these state governments will be ready for any curtailment in their existing tenure- and in their political power- which is the principal objective of any political party. Secondly and more importantly, what to do about the constitutional and moral right of the people of that state to be governed by the existing government which they have ‘popularly elected’?
Also, at a more political level, we usually see that one or two union ministers are made in charge of their political parties in the state elections. With the coming of the simultaneous elections, the entire national leadership of the national political parties would be on the ground specifically for the campaigning purpose. It might lead to the subordination of the state-level leadership who are more aware of the regional problems. And for these national-level leaders won’t be a part of the state governments formed after the elections and so, not being accountable to people of the state, the simultaneous election system poses a possibility of national-level leaders hijacking the state elections and ultimately leading to the loss of common people belonging to the concerned states.
It is, no doubt, true that a very huge amount is spent on the elections in India. But simultaneous elections, if they come into practice, may not be able to curb this huge expenditure. Regional parties will be contesting in their states and spending as they used to spend before the simultaneous election system. It will be only the national parties who really benefit from this electoral reform. So, these national parties will reap the economies of scale of one large election at the cost of regional parties. And all this will erode the very essence of federalism in India.
Systemic Challenges
In a parliamentary form of government, the provision of no-confidence motion is the most powerful weapon in the hands of the opposition to put a check on the power of the government. Being a parliamentary system, India is no exception to it. The system of simultaneous elections proposes to introduce a fixed schedule of elections, meaning there can’t be elections before or later that fixed date which will come after every five years. This gives rise to a stumbling block at both the central and state levels: if a no-confidence motion is passed and as the result, the existing government steps down, who should run the government till the next scheduled date of election comes?
Broadly, there remains two ways out. First one is suggested by the Law Commission of India in its 170th report, referring to the Article 67 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, namely, the ‘constructive vote of no confidence.’ The ‘constructive vote of no confidence’ entails no-confidence motion can be introduced in the parliament (in case of India, in only the Lok Sabha) only if it enables electing the successor with the support of majority. It has a very harmful implication for the parliamentary form of government, and for democracy, as it puts restrictions on the right of the opposition as a check on the power of the government through the weapon of the no-confidence motion. Second way-out is that of dissolving the Lok Sabha and allowing the existing government to continue for its remaining term by providing the ‘aid and advice to the President’, if no other party is able to secure the vote of the majority. It has a variety of serious implications for the parliamentary as well as democratic system. But this paper would not go into its details.
The second way-out, if applied to the state governments, creates one more possibility: enforcement of the Presidential rule until the new government is elected through the already scheduled election cycle. And, this affects the federal nature of the Indian polity. It blows away the original purpose of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, that is, inability of the existing government to govern ‘in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.’ In other words, isn’t continuing with the government that has lost the confidence of the legislature nothing different than an oligarchic rule? It will give a way for the central government to rule over the states through its agents, the governors. It will also encourage the central government to attempt frequently to topple the state governments, especially ruled by the opposition parties.
Any impact on the Rajya Sabha?
The Rajya Sabha is the upper house of the parliament facilitating representation of the states. The system of simultaneous elections is likely to have a two-fold impact on the functioning of the upper house of the parliament. If simultaneous election gives rise to, more or less, uniformity in the political parties running the central and state governments, it will also bring about the uniformity in the composition of the members of the Rajya Sabha as majority of them are elected from the legislative assemblies. This has two implications for federalism. One, it will put a challenge to the ability of the upper house to represent the diversity of opinion of the states. Second, uniformity in party/ coalition, ruling at both central and state levels, might monopolize the functioning of the Rajya Sabha by pushing the regional parties to the margin.
Another major likely impact of the simultaneous election on the Rajya Sabha is a more structural in nature: if the legislative assemblies are dissolved as the result of the no-confidence motion, how to put in new members to the upper house, until the new elections take place on the scheduled date of the simultaneous election? It is most likely to create a deadlock situation in the Rajya Sabha.
Both of these possible impacts on the Rajya Sabha will undermine the possibility of the regional parties to represent their states in the upper house of our parliament. It will also erode the functioning of the Rajya Sabha as a check on the Lok Sabha.
Way out
Almost all political parties have a consensus regarding the intentions behind the simultaneous elections in India. Problem regarding the simultaneous election is not about its desirability but its feasibility.
Here is a need to refer back to the justifications, mentioned earlier, of the proposal of the simultaneous election. The Election Commission of India spends approximately 1.8% of the total budget of the Government of India. This amount is worth spending considering the importance of the elections in the democracies. Rather, the government can introduce a cap on the spending of the political parties on elections, which accounts almost 9 to 10 times more than that of the government. If there will be no cap on the spending by the political parties on elections, even the simultaneous election system might not be able to save this extra-spent amount to a large extent.
The problem regarding the MCC resulting in a ‘policy paralysis’ seems to be overemphasized. The MCC does not suspend the ongoing schemes and their administration. It forbids only those activities of the government which can ‘influence the voters.’ As correctly noted by Suhas Palshikar, an eminent political analyst, in his piece in The Hindu (dated 02 February 2018), ‘this problem emerges only because parties and governments fail to arrive at a consensus on the scope of the code of conduct and the meaning of what constitutes policymaking and what constitutes distribution of patronage.’
The issue regarding the burden on the security forces during the elections is going to remain there even in the case of the simultaneous elections. And social unrest due to polarizing activities during the election has more to do with the routine, daily politics. This problem will anyways pop-up in times of the simultaneous election as well.
No compromise with federalism and representative democracy
The principles of federalism and representative democracy are foundation-stones of the Constitution of India and the Indian polity. The objective of the proposal of the simultaneous elections is to increase efficiency of our system. However, if the proposal of the simultaneous elections is implemented, it is most likely to pose a variety of serious implications for federalism: further strengthening the central government in an already vertical- as well as horizontal- asymmetric-federal polity of India. The contribution of the debate around simultaneous election is that it has highlighted many problems, as discussed earlier, and given momentum to discuss them. But if this electoral reform of ‘One Nation, One Election’ needs any compromise with federalism and democracy, we should take away positives from it and look ahead for better alternatives. After all, this is the significance of the freedom of expression and deliberation in any democracy in the world. And, it is more important in the world’s largest democracy which is also one of the most diverse nations in the world.
References
- https://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-03-16/news/48265556_1_crore-rs-17-rs-7
- https://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/06/13/holding-ls-assembly-polls-together-is-desirable but-not-feasible
- https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/should-india-have-simultaneous
elections/article22625444.ece
- Web link for the report of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice:
http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Per sonnel,%20PublicGrievances,%20Law%20and%20Justice/79.pdf accessed on 02 September 2018
- Web link for the report of the Law Commission of India:
http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/lc170.htm accessed on 02
- September 2018 Web link for the report of the NITI Ayog :
http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Ele ctions.pdf accessed on 02 September 2018
